



27 April 1967


CS/Pres Briefing

Twin Cities Industrial Conference (OCD)
Sheraton-Ritz, Minneapolis

I propose to concentrate this morning on our two major threats--the Soviet Union and Communist China--and then, as time permits, take up the Southeast Asian area generally, Vietnam, the Cuban threat to Latin America, and a quick look at some of the other trouble spots.

One word on security: You may get the feeling that some of the information and conclusions I am going to cover correspond to what you have already gotten from the press, radio, and television.

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THE SOVIET UNION

LEADERSHIP

I. THE MEN WHO THREW KHRUSHCHEV OUT OF THE KREMLIN TWO AND A HALF YEARS AGO HAVE NOW HAD TIME TO ESTABLISH THEIR POLICIES, THEIR RELATIONSHIPS, AND THEIR WAY OF DOING BUSINESS.

A. WHAT HAS EMERGED IS ESSENTIALLY A COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP.

1. I THINK IT WAS GEORGE ORWELL, HOWEVER, WHO ADVANCED THE THESIS THAT UNDER COMMUNISM SOME PEOPLE ARE MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS, AND THIS SEEMS TO APPLY TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, LEONID BREZHNEV.
2. BREZHNEV'S STANDING HAS BEEN GROWING STEADILY. HE APPEARS AT LEAST TO BE FIRST AMONG EQUALS.
3. BUT THE MAJOR DECISIONS, BY AND LARGE, ARE APPARENTLY REACHED BY COMPROMISE, AND IMPLEMENTED WITH CAUTION.

B. THIS TYPE OF COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP ELIMINATES THE ERRATIC INITIATIVES KHRUSHCHEV WAS NOTED FOR, AND IT REDUCES THE CHANCES OF MAKING BIG MISTAKES. IT HAS TWO INHERENT WEAKNESSES, HOWEVER.

1. FIRST, THERE IS A BUILT-IN TENDENCY TO DUCK OR POSTPONE THE HARD DECISIONS.

FOR INSTANCE, SUCH HIGHLY POLITICAL PROBLEMS AS ECONOMIC REFORM, AND THE ALLOCATION OF CRITICAL RESOURCES, HAVE NOT BEEN RESOLVED.

2. SECOND, THE GOVERNMENT DEVELOPS A SPLIT PERSONALITY, WITH COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP ON THE SURFACE, WHILE A SUBTLE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND POSITION CONTINUES UNDER COVER.

*(GRECHKO
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over Civilian)*

- C. THE PRESENT LEADERS ARE A BLEND OF MIXED INTERESTS AND AUTHORITY, AND WHATEVER THEY MAY NOW THINK OF THE ONE-MAN REGIMES OF STALIN AND KHRUSHCHEV, THAT'S WHERE THEY LEARNED THE GAME.

1. THEY HAVE NOT YET DEMONSTRATED THAT THEIR MACHINERY CAN MAKE THE HARD DECISIONS OVER THE LONG RUN, AND AT THE SAME TIME CHECK THE NATURAL DRIFT TOWARD ONE-MAN RULE.
2. SO FAR, THEY HAVE HELD TOGETHER REMARKABLY WELL, MAINLY BY UNDRAMATIC, MIDDLE-OF-THE-ROAD POLICIES. THE GUIDING PRINCIPLE HAS BEEN: "DON'T ROCK THE BOAT."

- II. THIS KREMLIN RULE-BY-COMMITTEE IN NO SENSE IMPLIES ANY WEAKENING OF THE MAJOR THRUST OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY, WHICH CONTINUES TO CENTER ON THE EXPANSION OF RUSSIAN INFLUENCE BEYOND THE BORDERS OF THE SOVIET UNION.

- A. THE COLD WAR DID NOT END WITH THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, THE FALL OF KHRUSHCHEV, THE NUCLEAR TEST

BAN TREATY, OR THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE.

B. RATHER, THE COLD WAR HAS CHANGED ITS CHARACTER AND ITS TACTICS. IT IS MORE POLITICAL, MORE SUBTLE, MORE GRADUAL. THE GOALS REMAIN THE SAME.

C. THE LOW-KEYED STYLE OF BREZHNEV AND KOSYGIN, IN FACT, IS PROBABLY BETTER SUITED TO THE COLD WAR AND THE NUCLEAR STALEMATE, AS THEY NOW STAND, THAN THE FLAMBOYANCE OF KHRUSHCHEV.

~~D. BREZHNEV AND KOSYGIN ARE MOVING MORE SLOWLY, BUT THEY ARE STILL MOVING ALONG THE SAME TESTED LINES OF POLICY AS THEIR PREDECESSORS, AND PERHAPS MORE EFFECTIVELY.~~

MILITARY

III. ONE GOOD MEASURE OF COMMUNIST COMMITMENT TO THE CONTINUATION OF THE COLD WAR IS TO EXAMINE WHAT THE RUSSIANS ARE DOING TO PREPARE FOR A POSSIBLE "HOT WAR." FOR SEVERAL YEARS THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN PUTTING A MAJOR EFFORT INTO A DYNAMIC PROGRAM OF MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, LOOKING FOR SOME KIND OF A BREAKTHROUGH THAT MIGHT END THE NUCLEAR STALEMATE AND SWING THE BALANCE OF POWER IN SOVIET FAVOR. (Chart, Soviet Defense Budgets)

A. THE SOVIET MILITARY BUDGET THIS YEAR IS THE BIGGEST SINCE WORLD WAR II--WE CALCULATE IT AT 19.8 BILLION RUBLES, WHICH WILL BUY THE RUSSIANS THE EQUIVALENT OF ABOUT \$54 BILLION SPENT IN THIS COUNTRY.

B. That exceeds what we are spending on defense, excluding the cost of the war in Vietnam.
C. About one third of the Soviet defense expenditures are going

FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSE AND STRATEGIC DEFENSE,
THE BULK OF THIS SHARE IS GOING INTO RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT, OR INTO SOPHISTICATED MILITARY
HARDWARE FOR ADVANCED WEAPONS SYSTEMS,

D. THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT ACHIEVED THE BREAKTHROUGH
THEY HAVE BEEN LOOKING FOR, AND WE HAVE NO INDICATIONS
THAT THEY MAY BE ON THE VERGE OF ONE,

1. THEY ARE, HOWEVER, IMPROVING ACROSS THE BOARD,
PARTICULARLY IN THEIR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE AND
DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES,

E. THEY REMAIN BEHIND THE UNITED STATES IN THE NUMBER
OF WARHEADS EACH CAN DELIVER ON THE TERRITORY OF
THE OTHER,

1. THERE IS, HOWEVER, A NEW DEPLOYMENT PROGRAM
UNDER WAY FOR ICBM'S WHICH IS A SOVIET BID TO
CATCH UP WITH US NUMERICALLY,

F. AT THE SAME TIME, AS YOU MAY HAVE SEEN IN THE
ACCOUNTS OF SECRETARY McNAMARA'S CONGRESSIONAL
TESTIMONY, THEY ARE DEPLOYING A DEFENSIVE SYSTEM
AROUND MOSCOW DESIGNED TO INTERCEPT INCOMING
BALLISTIC MISSILES,

1. WE DO NOT CONSIDER THIS A VERY EFFECTIVE
SYSTEM. IT CAN BE FOOLED, AND IT CAN BE
OVERWHELMED,

2. ALSO, IT IS BEING DEPLOYED ONLY AROUND MOSCOW.
THERE IS ANOTHER SYSTEM BEING DEPLOYED ON A
LARGE SCALE OVER MUCH OF THE SOVIET UNION,

BUT THIS SECOND SYSTEM DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE ALL THE ELEMENTS ESSENTIAL TO A BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE.

IV. THE IMPORTANT CONCLUSION TO BE DRAWN FROM EVERYTHING WE KNOW ABOUT THE SOVIET MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IS THIS:

- A. THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO INCREASE THEIR MILITARY BUDGET AND THEIR EFFORT TO ACHIEVE A MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH.
- B. OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS, THE RESULTING IMPROVEMENTS ARE GOING TO GIVE THE SOVIET LEADERS INCREASING CONFIDENCE THAT THEY ARE CREATING AN EFFECTIVE DETERRENT, IN THE FORM OF A MILITARY MACHINE WHICH CAN UNDERGO NUCLEAR ATTACK, AND STILL DELIVER ENOUGH PUNCH TO DESTROY A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF THE POPULATION AND RESOURCES OF THE UNITED STATES.
- C. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS THEMSELVES EXPECT TO BE STRONG ENOUGH--EVEN OVER THE NEXT TEN YEARS--TO CONSIDER THE DELIBERATE INITIATION OF A WAR AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.
- D. BUT GROWING CONFIDENCE IN OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES IS ONE OF THE FACTORS WHICH COULD LEAD TO DISASTROUS MISCALCULATIONS WHEN TWO COUNTRIES ARE TRYING TO FACE EACH OTHER DOWN, AT THE BRINK OF A WAR WHICH NEITHER MAY WANT.

Soviet Civil Defense

V. In Soviet propaganda, some of the military leaders have been boasting that they have such an effective defense against ballistic missiles that the Soviet Union does not need to worry about the imperialist rockets.

(DIAGRAM, Soviet Civil Defense Concept)

A. This does not go over very well with those responsible for civil defense in the Soviet Union, who still think little enough of the anti-ballistic missile so that their strategy centers on evacuation, as this diagram indicates.

1. ^{The} Soviet civil defense program ^{stresses} ~~stresses~~ low-cost approaches to population protection. It is

~~a makeshift program which~~ a makeshift program which still relies on basement-type blast shelters of World War II vintage, with little protection against fall-out.

2. *In Moscow and other major cities, subway stations* ~~It features the Moscow subway, and a program~~ *have blast doors, and there are booklets* ~~telling the individual citizen how he can~~

reinforce a root cellar, basement, or silage pit to serve as a shelter. *Many apartments built since 1950 have reinforced basement areas.*

3. There is no organized program to mark, improve, and stock adaptable public shelter areas.

4. Existing shelter areas are probably sufficient for 10 to 15 percent of the urban population.

B. The Soviet civil defense program, in other words, relies on sufficient warning to evacuate urban areas,

and is centered at present on providing protection for the command and control mechanism, ~~the~~ planning for reception of the evacuees ~~in~~ in the countryside, and rescue and recovery after the thermonuclear exchange begins.

(TABLE OF ORGANIZATION, SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE)

B. Until about 1960, Soviet Civil Defense was under the ~~MOD~~, or Ministry of Internal Affairs. ~~It was transferred~~ ^{In 1960 it} ~~and detailed statute in July, 1961, placed it,~~
as this Table of Organization shows, ^{to} ~~the~~ the Ministry ^{of} Defense, and specifically ^{to} the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Marshal Chuikov.

1. The Table of Organization parallels military command channels down to the local level, and specially trained military officers are assigned to civil defense as far down as city headquarters.
2. Much of the work, however, is carried on as it was during World War II by DOSAAF, a paramilitary organization which is a sort of a cross between the American Legion, the Navy League, and the R.O.T.C.
3. At the city level, civil defense becomes the responsibility of the civilian leaders who correspond to governors, mayors, plant managers, and the like in the United States.
4. The responsibility for establishing and preparing

shelters also seems to devolve to the local level, where a combination of apathy and shortage of funds has resulted in a program which by and large will apparently not begin providing the necessary shelters until an emergency is declared.

5. Citizens are subject to compulsory training, however, and are obligated to serve if selected for civil defense duty. There are about 100

civil defense schools scattered across the Soviet Union, and as much as half of the population has probably been ~~Soviet Union~~ The Soviets are probably behind exposed to some instruction in civil defense. us in ~~some~~ shelter preparation, but ahead of

us in drills involving large public participation.

- C. In short, the main emphasis in Soviet ^{Civil} Defense today appears to be on preparations to maintain the processes of government and cope with masses of evacuees when the cities are destroyed.

SOVIET RELATIONS WITH UNITED STATES.

VI. I WANT TO TOUCH BRIEFLY ON JUST TWO FACETS OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY--RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, AND THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE.

VII. IN PUBLIC, SOVIET SPOKESMEN ARE TAKING THE LINE THAT ANY IMPROVEMENT IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS IS GOING TO BE VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE AS LONG AS WE ARE ATTACKING THEIR COMMUNIST BRETHREN IN NORTH VIETNAM.

- A. THIS IS NOT ONLY A USEFUL BARGAINING POSITION WHICH TENDS TO MAKE US COMES TO THEM, BUT THEY ARE PRACTICALLY FORCED TO TAKE THIS STAND BECAUSE THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS ARE ACCUSING THE KREMLIN OF WORKING WITH THE UNITED STATES AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM.
- B. IN FACT, HOWEVER, SOVIET LEADERS HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY WANT TO AVOID ANY SHOWDOWN WITH WASHINGTON OVER THE VIETNAMESE ISSUE.
- C. THEY ARE, OF COURSE, DELIGHTED TO SEE MAJOR PORTIONS OF OUR FORCES TIED DOWN IN VIETNAM, BUT THEY ALSO REALIZE THAT THEY MUST KEEP THEIR LINES TO WASHINGTON OPEN AND WORKING, IF THEY WANT ANY PROGRESS ON THE ISSUES THAT REALLY CONCERN THEM--SUCH AS EUROPEAN SECURITY, ARMS CONTROL, GERMANY, AND EAST-WEST TRADE.
- D. AS YOU KNOW, THERE HAS BEEN SOME PROGRESS ON ISSUES NOT AFFECTING VIETNAM--FOR INSTANCE, THE RECENT CIVIL AIR AND SPACE AGREEMENTS, AND THE INDICATIONS

THAT IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO AGREE ON A NUCLEAR
NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY,

THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

VIII. AS FOR THE STATUS OF THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE, RELATIONS
BETWEEN MOSCOW AND PEKING HAVE HIT ROCK-BOTTOM, AND WE
DO NOT EXPECT TO SEE ANY IMPROVEMENT AS LONG AS THE
PRESENT LEADERSHIPS REMAIN IN CONTROL AT EACH END OF
THE LINE.

A. THE CHINESE HAVE BEEN DOING THEIR BEST IN RECENT
WEEKS TO GOAD MOSCOW INTO A FINAL BREAK IN
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

1. ~~THEY HAVE EASED UP A BIT ON THEIR VIRTUAL
SIEGE OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN PEKING, BUT
THEY HAVE ALREADY DEMONSTRATED THAT THEY CAN
FORCE EVERY LAST RUSSIAN OUT OF CHINA WHENEVER
THEY DECIDE TO DO SO.~~

B. MOSCOW IS TRYING TO HANG ON, AND BUILD A RECORD WHICH
CAN BE USED TO PIN THE BLAME ON THE CHINESE IF IT
COMES TO A FINAL BREAK.

C. WHAT IS AT STAKE IS THE SUPPLY LINE TO NORTH VIETNAM.
EACH COUNTRY WANTS TO BE ABLE TO PROVE THAT IT IS
THE MAJOR SUPPORT OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE, AND THAT
THE OTHER COUNTRY IS JUST SITTING ON ITS HANDS, IF NOT
ACTUALLY HINDERING THE WAR EFFORT.

D. ONE IMPORTANT BIT OF BACKGROUND INFORMATION IS

THAT THE PORT OF HAIPHONG IN NORTH VIETNAM,
WHATEVER THE HEADLINES MAY SAY, IS NOT A MAJOR
FACTOR IN THE SUPPLY OF WEAPONS TO NORTH VIETNAM.

1. WE KNOW WHAT GOES INTO HAIPHONG. SHIPS HAVE
BROUGHT IN HALF A DOZEN BIG HELICOPTERS, AND
THEY MAY HAVE BROUGHT IN AN OCCASIONAL BATCH OF
SMALL ARMS OR AMMUNITION. OIL AND GAS, AND SOME
TRUCKS, OF COURSE, ARE SHIPPED IN BY SEA.
 2. BUT THE WEAPONS, AND THE BULK OF THE WAR MATERIEL
GENERALLY, COME IN OVERLAND, ACROSS CHINA.
 3. TO A GREAT DEGREE, THIS IS BECAUSE OF SOVIET
RELUCTANCE TO RISK A CONFRONTATION WITH THE
UNITED STATES ON THE HIGH SEAS.
 4. AND THIS IS PRECISELY THE CONFRONTATION THE
CHINESE COMMUNISTS WANT TO BRING ABOUT.
- E. MOSCOW HAS CHARGED THAT THE CHINESE ARE DIVERTING,
DELAYING, SABOTAGING, STEALING, AND EVEN RE-LABELING
SOVIET WAR MATERIEL PASSING THROUGH CHINA TO VIETNAM.
- F. THE CHINESE, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAVE ACCUSED MOSCOW OF
"COWARDICE" FOR REFUSING TO SHIP BY SEA. PEKING
PROBABLY BELIEVES THAT IN A PINCH, THE SOVIETS WOULD
STILL REFUSE, AND PEKING COULD THEN TELL THE WORLD
COMMUNIST PARTIES THAT RUSSIA HAD ABANDONED THE
NORTH VIETNAMESE, RATHER THAN FACE UP TO AMERICAN
SEA POWER.

COMMUNIST CHINA

I. COMMUNIST CHINA ITSELF HAS BEEN ROCKED FOR ALMOST A YEAR NOW BY THE UPHEAVAL THEY CALL THE "CULTURAL REVOLUTION."

A. YOU HAVE ALL SEEN PICTURES OF SWARMS OF CHINESE TEEN-AGERS ON THE MARCH, HOLDING LITTLE RED BOOKS FROM WHICH THEY CHANT QUOTATIONS OF MAO TSE-TUNG.

B. IN CHINA TODAY, MAO'S QUOTATIONS ARE CREDITED WITH ALMOST MIRACULOUS POWER, ALTHOUGH FOR THE MOST PART THEY ARE A COLLECTION OF TIRED OLD CLICHÉS LIKE "ALL POWER COMES OUT OF THE BARREL OF A GUN," OR "BE RESOLUTE, FEAR NO SACRIFICE, AND SURMOUNT EVERY DIFFICULTY TO WIN VICTORY."

1. PEKING RADIO SAYS FIGHTER PILOTS SHOUTED MAO'S THOUGHTS OVER THE INTERCOM AS THEY STARTED A DOG-FIGHT, AND WERE THEREFORE ABLE TO SHOOT DOWN A CHINESE NATIONALIST AIRCRAFT.

2. A FORESTRY CONFERENCE IN PEKING CONCLUDED THAT THE STUDY OF MAO WOULD ENABLE THE FORESTRY SERVICE TO GROW BETTER TREES.

3. A WORKER IN LANCHOU, WHO BROKE AN ARM, A LEG AND SEVERAL RIBS IN A FALL ON THE JOB, WAS REPORTED TO HAVE REFUSED SICK LEAVE, BECAUSE MAO'S THOUGHTS ENABLED HIM TO LIVE WITH THE PAIN.

~~D. EVEN THE RUSSIANS WHO HAVE BEEN KNOWN TO QUOTE MARY AND LENIN, FIND MAO'S THOUGHTS A BIT STILT. PRAVDA CITED THE CASE OF A CHINESE WHO REMARKED THAT IF A~~

~~MAN DIDN'T KNOW HOW TO CLIMB A POLE, MAO'S THOUGHTS~~

~~WOULDN'T HELP HIM DO IT. HE WAS DENOUNCED AND PURGED, OF COURSE, BECAUSE EVERYBODY IN CHINA KNOWS THAT "A STUDY OF CHAIRMAN MAO'S THOUGHTS GIVES IMMEDIATE RESULTS."~~

II. To us, it sounds ridiculous, but for the Chinese it is in deadly earnest. ~~[A STREET MOB RECENTLY FORCED THE CHINESE CHIEF OF STATE, LIU SHAO CHI, TO RECITE MAO QUOTATIONS FROM MEMORY, AND RIDICULED HIM WHEN HE FLUENCED A LINE. THIS IDOLATRY OF MAO IS THE KEYSTONE OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION.]~~

A. MAO, AT 73, IS AGING, SICK, AND MORE AND MORE INFLEXIBLE. HE IS OBVIOUSLY CONCERNED THAT HIS COMMUNIST PARTY IS LOSING THE REVOLUTIONARY ZEAL OF ITS EARLY DAYS, AND CANNOT BE RELIED UPON TO KEEP CHINA ON THE RIGHT TRACK AFTER HE IS GONE.

1. THE TEEN-AGED MILLIONS OF THE RED GUARD ARE SUPPOSED TO RE-KINDLE THAT ZEAL WITH THEIR UNBRIDLED AND UNCRITICAL ENTHUSIASM.

B. TO MAO, THEN, THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION IS PRIMARILY A DRIVE TO RE-INVIGORATE THE COMMUNIST PARTY, OR EVEN TO REPLACE IT WITH A MORE RELIABLE, MORE FANATICAL, YOUNGER VERSION.

C. BUT FOR THE MEN WHO ARE COMPETING TO SUCCEED MAO, IT HAS BECOME A NAKED STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND FOR SURVIVAL.

(CHART, CHICOM LEADERS)

III. DEFENSE MINISTER LIN PIAO WAS PROCLAIMED MAO'S SUCCESSOR LAST AUGUST. HE IMMEDIATELY BEGAN MOVING AGAINST ANY POTENTIAL RIVALS.

A. HIS MAIN TARGETS WERE THE MEN WHO HAVE BEEN AT THE

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TOP OF THE PARTY MACHINERY, CHIEF OF STATE LIU SHAO-CHI, WHO USED TO RANK SECOND IN THE HIERARCHY, AND THE PARTY SECRETARY-GENERAL, TENG HSIAO-PING.

B. TODAY, LIN PIAO STILL GETS BILLING AND PRAISE SECOND ONLY TO THAT GIVEN MAO, BUT HE ~~HAS BEEN~~

~~A SPEECH SINCE EARLY NOVEMBER, AND HASN'T APPEARED IN PUBLIC SINCE LATE NOVEMBER.~~ **WAS OUT OF SIGHT FOR ALMOST FIVE MONTHS, AND**

~~INSTEAD, THE PREMIER, CHOU EN-LAI,~~ **HAS BEEN** THE DOMINANT FIGURE IN PEKING.

1. CHOU REPRESENTS THE GOVERNMENT, AS LIN REPRESENTS THE ARMY, AND LIU AND TENG REPRESENTED THE PARTY. IF THERE IS SUCH A THING IN COMMUNIST CHINA, HE IS A RELATIVE MODERATE. HIS MAIN CONCERN IS TO KEEP THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ECONOMY RUNNING.

C. LIN PIAO IS PROBABLY AN ARRESTED TUBERCULOSIS CASE, AND WAS ALSO SEVERELY WOUNDED DURING THE CIVIL WAR. PERIODICALLY, HE HAS TO TAKE EXTENDED PERIODS OF COMPLETE REST, AND THIS MAY ACCOUNT FOR ~~HIS ABSENCE SINCE NOVEMBER~~ **TEMPORARY** AND THE ASCENDANCY OF CHOU.

IV. BUT WE ALSO HAVE GOOD INDICATIONS THAT WHEN THE IN-FIGHTING AMONG THE CHINESE LEADERS REACHED A CRITICAL POINT LAST JANUARY, THE CHINESE ARMY TURNED OUT TO BE SOMEWHAT LESS THAN MONOLITHIC IN ITS LOYALTY TO MAO AND LIN.

A. THE OLD CHINESE WARLORDS HAVE BEEN SUCCEEDED BY POWERFUL PROVINCIAL PARTY BOSSES WHO HAVE STRONG FOLLOWINGS, A LONG WAY FROM PEKING, AND WHO OWE

THEIR JOBS TO ~~LIU SHAO-CHI AND TENG HSIAO-PING.~~

B. AT THE HEIGHT OF THE CRISIS, ORGANIZED WORKERS TOOK OVER THE STREETS IN PITCHED BATTLES WITH THE RED GUARDS, AND IN SOME INSTANCES ARMY TROOPS PROTECTED GOVERNMENT OFFICES, PARTY HEADQUARTERS, AND KEY INSTALLATIONS LIKE RADIO STATIONS FROM THE RED GUARDS.

~~C. AT ONE POINT, PEKING NEWSPAPERS CHARGED THAT FOR SOME TIME, POWERFUL PROVINCIAL BOSSES AND A NUMBER OF KEY MILITARY FIGURES HAD BEEN PLOTTING AGAINST MAO.~~

C. IN SHORT, THERE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN FORMIDABLE OPPOSITION LINED UP AGAINST MAO AND LIN, AND AGAINST THE EXCESSES OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION.

~~E. WE CAN ONLY ASSUME THAT THE REASON THE ARMY WASN'T USED TO CRUSH THIS OPPOSITION OVERNIGHT WAS BECAUSE MAO AND LIN DIAO HAD REASON TO DOUBT THE LOYALTY OF AT LEAST SOME ARMY UNITS.~~

D. IT WAS AT THIS POINT THAT CHOU EN-LAI BEGAN MAKING THE SPEECHES, NEGOTIATING WITH RECALCITRANT PROVINCIAL LEADERS, URGING THE RED GUARDS TO GO BACK TO SCHOOL, AND EVEN DEPLOYING LIN'S TROOPS TO ^{RESTORE} MAINTAIN ORDER.

E. ALL THIS SUPPORTS THE THEORY THAT THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS PROBABLY AVERTED A NEW CIVIL WAR BY PUTTING THE BRAKES ON THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND PUTTING THE MODERATES IN CHARGE FOR THE TIME BEING.

V. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT MAO AND LIN HAVE BURIED THE HATCHET WITH THE OPPOSITION. ~~AT THE END OF MARCH THEY~~ RESUMED THE PREPARATORY PROPAGANDA TO COMPLETE THE JOB OF DESTROYING

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- A. THERE IS ALSO A LEGACY OF MISTRUST AND BITTERNESS AMONG THE SURVIVING LEADERS WHICH MAKES IT VIRTUALLY CERTAIN THAT THE TURMOIL WILL BE RENEWED FROM TIME TO TIME.
- B. BUT FOR THE MOMENT THE MAIN NOTE IS EVIDENT IN CHOU'S REPEATED APPEALS TO GET THE COUNTRY MOVING AGAIN.
- C. THE CASUALTIES IN THE UPPER ECHELONS HAVE BEEN EXTENSIVE. ~~THIS~~

CHART ~~WHICH~~ SHOWS HOW THE LEADERS RANKED IN 1958, AND HOW MANY OF THEM HAVE NOW BEEN PURGED.

~~1. THIS SCORECARD IS NOT DEFINITIVE. COVERING THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION HAS BEEN SOMETHING LIKE TRYING TO PICK THE WINNER WHEN A DOZEN CATS ARE FIGHTING UNDER A RUB.~~

~~2.~~ I CALL YOUR ATTENTION TO THE GROUP OF 15 VICE-PREMIERS DOWN IN THE LOWER RIGHT-HAND CORNER. THESE ARE THE MEN WHO, UNDER CHOU, RUN THE MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT.

2. THE PURGE HIT THESE MEN SO HARD THAT AT ONE POINT, THERE WERE ONLY SIX OF THEM, NOT COUNTING LIN PIAO, WHO HAD NOT FALLEN VICTIM TO THE RED GUARDS AND THEIR WALL POSTERS.

3. CHOU HAD TO APPEAL REPEATEDLY THAT THESE SIX BE LEFT ALONE AND ALLOWED TO GET ON WITH THEIR WORK--AND YET AS RECENTLY AS ~~LATE MARCH~~ ^{LAST MONTH} THE RED GUARDS WERE HOWLING FOR THE HEADS OF THE MINISTERS OF PLANNING,

FINANCE, AND AGRICULTURE

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VI. THE LONG-RANGE EFFECT OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION REMAINS UP IN THE AIR, BUT THERE ARE THREE POINTS WE CAN BE FAIRLY SURE OF:

- ==FIRST, UNTIL MAO GOES AND A NEW LEADER HAS TAKEN FIRM CONTROL, CHINA'S LEADERS ARE GOING TO BE DIVIDED AND IN CONFLICT. THEY WILL FIND IT DIFFICULT TO AGREE TO ANY NEW POLICY LINE, SO WE DO NOT EXPECT ANY RADICAL DEPARTURES FROM EXISTING POLICIES.
- ==SECOND, FOR SOME TIME TO COME, THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS WILL PROBABLY SUFFER FROM A CULTURAL REVOLUTION HANGOVER THAT COULD LIMIT THEIR CAPACITY TO ENGAGE IN FOREIGN ADVENTURES.
- ==AND THIRD, WHOEVER WINS, WE CAN SEE NO REASON TO EXPECT ANY DILUTION OF PEKING'S IMPLACABLE HOSTILITY TOWARD THE UNITED STATES.

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PG 8
Military Power
~~CHINESE STRATEGY~~

(B)

~~I. WHY DO THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS HATE US? BECAUSE WE ARE WHITE, BECAUSE WE ARE CAPITALISTS, AND BECAUSE WE ARE THERE. OR TO PUT IT IN MORE DIPLOMATIC LANGUAGE, BECAUSE WE ARE NOT ORIENTAL, NOT COMMUNIST, AND ^{WE} HAVE ESTABLISHED A PRESENCE IN ASIA.~~

- CHINESE*
- A. THE PEKING LEADERS HAVE ENOUGH SENSE OF ^AHISTORY TO INHERIT THE OLD IMPERIAL HOSTILITY TOWARD THE FOREIGN DEVILS.
- B. TO THIS HAS BEEN ADDED THE COMMUNIST THESIS THAT THERE CAN BE NO LASTING PEACE BETWEEN COMMUNIST AND NON-COMMUNIST NATIONS.
- C. ADD TO THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCE THAT WORLD WAR II LEFT US THE ONLY FREE WORLD NATION WITH THE POWER AND THE INTERESTS TO CHALLENGE THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS IN THE FAR EAST.

II. AT THE TIME THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE BEGAN IN 1960, WHEN THE SOVIET UNION CUT OFF ALL AID TO COMMUNIST CHINA, PEKING WAS LEFT WITH THE DETERMINATION TO RENOUNCE CO-EXISTENCE AND STAND THE FREE WORLD ON ITS EAR, BUT VERY LITTLE BY WAY OF ASSETS TO DO THE JOB.

- A. WE HAVE MEASURED THEIR ARMED FORCES IN KOREA. THEY HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO OVERRUN ANY OF CHINA'S MAINLAND NEIGHBORS--RUSSIA EXCEPTED, OF COURSE-- BUT ONLY AS LONG AS THEY DO NOT ENCOUNTER SIGNIFICANT OPPOSITION FROM A MAJOR POWER. ~~THIS IS ONE THING THAT MADE OUR PRESENCE IN THE FAR EAST~~

1. THE ARMY IS STILL BASICALLY A SUB-STANDARD WORLD WAR TWO ARMY. THERE ARE ABOUT 2,300,000 MEN, IN ABOUT 100 INFANTRY AND A DOZEN ARMORED OR ARTILLERY DIVISIONS, BUT THEY ARE SHORT ON ARMOR, HEAVY ORDNANCE, MECHANIZED TRANSPORT, AND FUEL.
2. THE MIG-15s AND 17s^{WHICH} THE CHINESE AIR FORCE GOT FROM THE RUSSIANS, OR BUILT WITH THEIR HELP, ARE OUTDATED, AND THE UNDER-TRAINED COMMUNIST PILOTS FLYING THEM HAVE BEEN OUTFOUGHT BY CHINESE NATIONALISTS.
3. THE NAVY HAS THE WORLD'S FOURTH LARGEST SUBMARINE FLEET, BUT NO SEA-KEEPING EXPERIENCE; IT IS A COASTAL DEFENSE FORCE.

B. IF WE WERE CONCERNED SOLELY WITH THE CONVENTIONAL CHINESE FORCES, THAT WOULD JUST ABOUT COVER THE SUBJECT.

III

BUT THE FACT IS THAT OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS, THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS HAVE MORE THAN MADE UP FOR THE LOSS OF SOVIET ASSISTANCE IN 1960, AND HAVE EMERGED WITH THEIR OWN FAMILY OF ADVANCED WEAPONS SYSTEMS.

A. ~~THEY HAVE ACHIEVED THIS ONLY AT THE COST OF OVERRIDING PRIORITIES WHICH HAVE RAISED HOB WITH THE REST OF THE ECONOMY. BUT~~ THEY HAVE DONE IT ENTIRELY ON THEIR OWN, AND THE MAJOR ACHIEVEMENT, OF COURSE, HAS BEEN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NUCLEAR CAPABILITY.

B. AT PRESENT, THE CHINESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY

IS CRUDE AND LIMITED BY OUR STANDARDS, BUT BY FAR EASTERN STANDARDS IT IS A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO CHINESE COMMUNIST MILITARY PRESTIGE.

C. OUR ANALYSIS OF THE FIVE NUCLEAR TESTS TO DATE INDICATES THAT THE CHINESE CAN ALREADY PACKAGE A NUCLEAR DEVICE FOR DELIVERY BY THEIR HANDFUL OF AGING MEDIUM BOMBERS.

1. THEY MAY BE WORKING ON ONE THAT COULD BE DELIVERED BY A LIGHT JET BOMBER. THEY HAVE ABOUT 250 ^{AIRCRAFT} OF THESE ON HAND.

D. THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THE TESTS, HOWEVER, WAS THE FOURTH, IN WHICH THE NUCLEAR DEVICE WAS DELIVERED BY SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE, PROBABLY OVER A 500-MILE DISTANCE.

(MAP CHICOM

III

MRBM RANGE) WE BELIEVE THAT THE CHINESE HAVE BEEN DEVELOPING A MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILE WITH A REACH OF ABOUT 1,000 NAUTICAL MILES, AND THAT THEY CAN PROBABLY BEGIN DEPLOYING OPERATIONAL MISSILES OF THIS TYPE, WITH NUCLEAR WARHEADS, THIS YEAR.

A. FROM THE BORDERS OF CHINA, A MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILE CAN COVER ALL OF JAPAN AND THE PHILIPPINES, A GOOD SHARE OF INDONESIA, ALL OF SOUTHEAST ASIA AND SOUTH ASIA, AND EASTERN AND SOUTHERN RUSSIA AS FAR AS THE CASPIAN SEA.

B. A MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILE, OF COURSE, COULD NOT REACH ALASKA, OR HAWAII, OR EVEN GUAM. BUT WE ALSO HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE CHINESE MIGHT BE ABLE

TO DEPLOY THEIR FIRST CRUDE INTERCONTINENTAL

3

BALLISTIC MISSILE IN THE EARLY 1970's.

1. WE WILL NOT BE SURPRISED IF THEY ATTEMPT TO LAUNCH A SMALL SPACE SATELLITE SOME TIME LATE THIS YEAR.

C. THE CHINESE HAVE ASSEMBLED ONE COPY OF A SOVIET SUBMARINE WHICH CAN ~~COME TO THE SURFACE AND~~ ^{three} LAUNCH BALLISTIC MISSILES WITH A 350-MILE RANGE, **BUT ONLY WHEN SURFACED**

1. THEY MAY NOT YET HAVE DEVELOPED THE MISSILE FOR THIS SUBMARINE, AND AS I SAID, THEY HAVE NO EXPERIENCE IN EXTENDED OPERATIONS, BUT THEY CERTAINLY DID NOT BUILD THIS SUBMARINE FOR CONVENTIONAL COASTAL DEFENSE PURPOSES.

2. ~~THEY HAVE ALSO BEGUN LAUNCHING A FLEET OF FAST PATROL BOATS CARRYING GUIDED MISSILES WHICH HAVE A GREATER RANGE THAN THE CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENT OF A DESTROYER. WHICH WAS IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR NAVAL FORCES OFF VIETNAM.~~

D. CHINESE FACTORIES ARE ~~ALSO~~ BEGINNING TO TURN OUT ADVANCED AIRCRAFT TO REPLACE AND SUPPLEMENT THEIR OBSOLESCEANT AIR FORCE INVENTORY.

1. OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS THEY HAVE PRODUCED ENOUGH COPIES OF THE MIG-19 SO THAT THEY WERE ABLE TO SPARE SOME FOR PAKISTAN.
2. WE EXPECT THAT THEY WILL SOON BEGIN TURNING OUT CHINESE VERSIONS OF THE MIG-21 AND THE SOVIET BADGER JET MEDIUM BOMBER.

CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

IV. When we look for the bases of Chinese foreign policy, we must bear in mind that they are an ancient people [who used to call their empire the "Middle Kingdom," because to them it was the center of the world.

(MAP, "PEKING'S LOST EMPIRE")

- A. This map, for instance, published in a Chinese Communist history textbook, ~~shows~~ shows areas once under Chinese domination which they complain were seized from the crumbling Chinese empire by unfair treaties with Russia.
1. You can see that their claims also extend to all of Southeast Asia, and even parts of India and Pakistan.

(MAP, PEKING GEOCENTRIC)

- B. This map appears to be upside down; actually, it is a geocentric map, centered on Peking, showing the ~~Far East~~ as it appears strategically to the Chinese.
1. From this viewpoint, Southeast Asia is a natural ante-room for China, and not just Taiwan, but the Japanese, Philippine and Indonesian archipelagoes are China's offshore islands.
 2. Bear in mind that most of the countries south of China have at one time or another been vassals or tributaries of the Middle

Asia is normally a rice surplus area.

China, on the other hand, is less than 15 percent arable, and over the past decade the population has grown by more than 20 percent while ~~the~~ food production has either stood still or--in bad years--decreased.


6
VI. Part of the Chinese grudge against ~~the~~ ^{Moscow}, then, is not an ideological dispute with the Soviet Union, but an inherent desire to reclaim Chinese territory seized by Imperial Russia.

- A. The Russians, like us, are by and large a people of Caucasian stock, and therefore the Chinese on racial grounds can hate Russians and Americans with equal fervor, because we are foreign devils, and white foreign devils to boot.
- B. But their hostility toward the United States is more implacable and more enduring for two reasons:
- C. Firstly, we are the world's champions of free enterprise, and the Chinese as basic Marxists believe that war between Communism and Capitalism is inevitable.
- D. Secondly, World War II not only carried American influence to the far shores of the Pacific, but left us the only Free World ~~Nation~~ with the power and the motivation to contain the Chinese

E. The Chinese, then, hate us because we are foreigners, because we are capitalists, and because we are there.

VI. Khrushchev is reported to have commented at one time that Mao's strategy would welcome ~~the~~ global thermonuclear war, because China was the only country ~~that~~ that could lose 300 million people and still ~~be a power~~ survive as a nation.

A. This is bound to play some part in Chinese Communist thinking, but for the present, despite all the belligerent Peking propaganda about support for North Vietnam, we think that there are probably only three circumstances in which the Chinese would feel obliged to intervene there with military force:



W. ~~WHAT ARE THEY GOING TO DO WITH THESE MODERN WEAPONS~~
~~AS THEY BECOME OPERATIONAL, AND NUMEROUS? WELL, THERE~~
~~HAS BEEN A LOT OF BELLIGERENT TALK FROM THE CHINESE OVER~~
~~VIETNAM, BUT WE THINK THERE ARE PROBABLY ONLY THREE~~
~~CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH PEKING WOULD FEEL OBLIGED TO~~
~~INTERVENE THERE WITH MILITARY FORCE.~~

B. ~~A~~ ONE WOULD BE IN THE EVENT OF U.S. AIR STRIKES AGAINST CHINA ITSELF.

C. ~~B~~ THE SECOND WOULD BE A MAJOR U. S. INVASION OF NORTH VIETNAM.

D. ~~C~~ AND THE THIRD WOULD BE THE THREAT OF IMMINENT COLLAPSE OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT.

E. ~~D~~ THIS ANALYSIS, OF COURSE, IS BASED TO SOME EXTENT ON A RATIONAL CHINESE ASSESSMENT OF THEIR NATIONAL INTERESTS. SO WE FIND IT NECESSARY, IN MAKING THIS EVALUATION, TO POINT OUT THAT THERE IS NOTHING IN THE RECENT TRACK RECORD OF MAO TSE-TUNG TO GUARANTEE THAT HIS DECISIONS ARE GOING TO BE BASED ON RATIONAL ASSESSMENTS.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

I. OBVIOUSLY, THEN, WE CANNOT DISMISS OUT OF HAND THE POSSIBILITY OF A SHOOTING WAR WITH COMMUNIST CHINA, AND THE NATIONS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA HAVE EVEN MORE REASON TO BE APPREHENSIVE. *Let's*

~~A. IN THE TIME THAT REMAINS, I PROPOSE TO TAKE A QUICK LOOK AROUND SOUTHEAST ASIA, AND THEN WIND UP WITH SOME NOTES ON THE VIETNAM PROBLEM.~~

~~II. THERE ARE TWO FACTS THAT CHINA'S IMMEDIATE NEIGHBORS HAVE TO BEAR IN MIND. (MAP - PEKING GEOCENTRIC.)~~

A. ONE IS THAT SOUTHEAST ASIA IS NORMALLY A RICE SURPLUS AREA, WHILE IN CHINA, OVER THE PAST NINE YEARS, THE POPULATION HAS GROWN BY 20 PERCENT WHILE FOOD PRODUCTION HAS EITHER STOOD STILL OR-- IN BAD YEARS--DECREASED. LESS THAN 15 PERCENT OF CHINA IS ARABLE.

B. THE SECOND FACT IS THAT HISTORICALLY, AT ONE TIME OR ANOTHER VIRTUALLY EVERY ONE OF THE SMALL NATIONS SOUTH OF CHINA HAS BEEN A PART OR A VASSAL OF CHINA--ONE REASON THEY CALLED IT THE "MIDDLE KINGDOM," BECAUSE TO THE ANCIENT CHINESE IT WAS THE CENTER OF THE WORLD.

1. IF YOU LOOK AT A GEOCENTRIC PROJECTION OF THE WORLD MAP, CENTERED ON PEKING, SOUTHEAST ASIA LOOKS LIKE AN ANTE-ROOM FOR CHINA, AND NOT ONLY TAIWAN, BUT THE JAPANESE, PHILIPPINE AND INDONESIAN ARCHIPELAGOES ARE CHINA'S OFFSHORE

(Map, FE + SEA)

INDONESIA

II.

~~FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, JAPAN AND THE PHILIPPINES ARE UNDER OUR PROTECTION, BUT~~ UNTIL RECENTLY, THE 100 MILLION PEOPLE OF INDONESIA, WITH EXTENSIVE POTENTIAL RESOURCES AND IMPORTANT STRATEGIC GEOGRAPHY, WERE SLIDING SLOWLY BUT SURELY INTO THE GRASP OF PEKING.

- A.** THE CHINESE DIDN'T HAVE TO BUILD A SINGLE LANDING CRAFT, OR MAKE A BELLIGERENT GESTURE. THEY SIMPLY BUILT UP THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDONESIA, SUPPORTED AND GUIDED IT, AND CONVINCED PRESIDENT SUKARNO THAT CHINESE COMMUNISM WAS THE WAVE OF THE FUTURE.
- B.** THE PRO-WESTERN INDONESIAN ARMY HAD ALMOST BEEN NEUTRALIZED; THE ANTI-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES HAD BEEN BANNED OR PLACED UNDER TIGHT CONTROLS; AND THE AIR FORCE AND NAVY WERE UNDER PRO-COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP, WHEN A BADLY TIMED AND BUNGLED COUP ATTEMPT GAVE THE ARMY LEADERS A CHANCE TO TURN THE TABLES.
- C.** TODAY, THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDONESIA HAS BEEN SHATTERED, AND GENERAL SUHARTO HAS ALMOST COMPLETED THE DELICATE AND DIFFICULT JOB OF TAKING AWAY ALL POWER FROM SUKARNO. THIS HAS BEEN TIME-CONSUMING, BECAUSE TO MANY INDONESIANS SUKARNO IS STILL A COMBINATION OF GEORGE WASHINGTON AND MOHAMMED, ---WITH A CONSIDERABLE DASH OF DON JUAN.

D. BUT THE PROCESS HAS BEEN SOMETHING LIKE
SAVING A HUNTER FROM THE WOLVES, ONLY TO
FIND THAT HE IS DYING OF STARVATION. IF IT
WERE POSSIBLE TO BANKRUPT A NATION, INDONESIA
IS BANKRUPT. IT OWES MORE THAN TWO ^{AND A HALF} BILLION
DOLLARS. JUST TO PUT THE ECONOMY ON A SURVIVAL
BASIS IS GOING TO TAKE YEARS OF CAREFUL PLANNING,
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON RE-SCHEDULING DEBTS,
AND HEAVY INFUSIONS OF FINANCIAL HELP.

~~(MAP, SOUTHEAST ASIA)~~
CAMBODIA

III **B.** THE KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA STANDS TODAY ABOUT WHERE
INDONESIA STOOD FOUR OR FIVE YEARS AGO.

A. THE VOLATILE RULER, PRINCE SIHANOUK, HAS DECIDED
THAT OVER THE LONG RUN THE COMMUNISTS, AND COMMUNIST
CHINA IN PARTICULAR, ARE GOING TO BE THE WINNERS
IN THE FAR EAST.

B. HE IS ACCORDINGLY TRYING TO TAKE OUT INSURANCE,
BOTH FOR HIS OWN FUTURE AND FOR THAT OF HIS
COUNTRY, BY ESTABLISHING CLOSE RELATIONS WITH
PEKING, AND WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AND THE
VIET CONG,

C. RECENTLY HE MAY HAVE HAD SOME SECOND THOUGHTS,
PARTLY BECAUSE OF THE COURSE OF THE WAR IN VIETNAM,
PARTLY BECAUSE THE COMMUNISTS HAVE REFUSED TO GIVE
HIM THE ASSURANCES HE WANTS ON THE ^{INDEPENDENCE} ~~INTEGRITY~~ OF
CAMBODIA AND SOME LONG-STANDING BORDER DISPUTES
WITH THE VIETNAMESE.

(5)

\$1.

HIS THINKING IS CONDITIONED, HOWEVER, BY THE HISTORIC HOSTILITY BETWEEN CAMBODIA ON THE ONE HAND, AND THE VIETNAMESE AND THE THAIS ON THE OTHER. THIS SITUATION IS NOT HELPED BY THE ACTIVITIES OF CAMBODIAN EXILE GROUPS, ALTERNATELY TOLERATED AND SUPPORTED BY SAIGON AND BANGKOK.

2.

SIHANOUK BELIEVES FIRMLY THAT THE VIETNAMESE AND THE THAIS ARE PUPPETS OF THE UNITED STATES, AND HE THEREFORE ALSO HOLDS US RESPONSIBLE FOR EVERYTHING THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE AND THE THAIS DO.

D

THE EVIDENCE IS THAT SIHANOUK IS AGAINST VIET CONG USE OF CAMBODIAN TERRITORY FOR RE-GROUPING, REFUGE, AND SUPPLY LINES, BUT HE DOES NOT HAVE FIRM CONTROL OF THE REMOTE BORDER AREAS, SO THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS USE CAMBODIAN ASYLUM PRETTY MUCH AS THEY PLEASE.

LAOS

N

LAOS THEORETICALLY WAS NEUTRALIZED BY THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS, AND IS RULED BY A COALITION GOVERNMENT OF RIGHTISTS, NEUTRALISTS, AND COMMUNISTS UNDER THE NEUTRALIST PRIME MINISTER, PRINCE SOUVANNA PHOUMA.

A.

IN ACTUAL FACT, THE PRINCIPAL RIGHTISTS HAVE MADE GRABS FOR POWER AND BEEN DRIVEN FROM THE COUNTRY. THE COMMUNISTS HAVE HUNG ON TO THEIR HALF OF LAOS, WHICH IS VITAL FOR THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL, THE SUPPLY LINE TO SOUTH VIETNAM. THEY HAVE REFUSED TO TAKE THE MINISTRIES ASSIGNED TO THEM IN THE LAOTIAN GOVERNMENT.

(5)

B. THAT LEAVES THE NEUTRALISTS. THE NEUTRALIST MILITARY COMMANDER, KONG LE, HAS BEEN RENOUNCED BY HIS OWN OFFICERS, AND SHIPPED OUT OF THE COUNTRY. AND THE NEUTRALIST PRIME MINISTER, PRINCE SOUVANNA, HAS BECOME A FIRM ANTI-COMMUNIST THE HARD WAY.

1. FOR ONE THING, THE COMMUNIST LEADER, HIS OWN HALF-BROTHER, PRINCE SOUPHANNOUVONG, HAS REFUSED TO NEGOTIATE OR EVEN MEET WITH HIM, AND HAS REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE AUTHORITY OF THE GOVERNMENT IN THE PATHET LAO, OR COMMUNIST, PART OF THE COUNTRY.
2. FOR ANOTHER, THERE ARE NOW SOME 15,000 NORTH VIETNAMESE COMBAT TROOPS, AND ANOTHER 13,000 TO 15,000 SUPPORT TROOPS, IN LAOS, SHOWING NO SIGNS OF LEAVING.

C. THE FIGHTING IN LAOS DOESN'T HIT THE HEADLINES, BUT IT CONTINUES. GUERRILLAS OF THE MEO TRIBE, FIGHTING ON THE GOVERNMENT SIDE, MAKE A LITTLE HEADWAY IN THE RAINY SEASON, AND THEN THE NORTH VIETNAMESE TAKE IT BACK AGAIN IN THE DRY SEASON. LAST YEAR THERE WERE MORE THAN 1,600 ENGAGEMENTS IN LAOS. THIS IS TRULY THE "FORGOTTEN WAR."

THAILAND

V. I WANT TO MENTION THAILAND BECAUSE, WHETHER YOU ACCEPT THE DOMINO THEORY OR NOT, THAILAND IS THE NEXT COMMUNIST TARGET IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

A. THAILAND IS A MEMBER OF THE SOUTHEAST ASIA TREATY

THAIS CAME CLOSE TO WAVERING WAS IN 1961 AND 1962, WHEN THE REST OF SEATO WENT TO GENEVA INSTEAD OF INTERVENING AGAINST THE COMMUNISTS IN LAOS. AT THAT TIME, THE THAIS SUSPECTED THEY HAD BEEN LEFT OUT ON A LIMB, AND THEY DID NOT PROPOSE TO EXPOSE THEMSELVES IN THE SAME WAY AGAIN.

1. NOW, HOWEVER, THE THAI GOVERNMENT IS CONFIDENT THAT THE UNITED STATES IS COMMITTED IN VIETNAM FOR THE DURATION, AND THEY ARE GIVING US WHOLE-HEARTED COOPERATION.

(SPEAKING OF WHOLE-HEARTED COOPERATION, THAILAND ALSO HAS A CHARMING YOUNG QUEEN WHO LEARNED A FEW WORDS OF ENGLISH JUST FOR HER STATE VISIT TO WASHINGTON A FEW YEARS AGO.

25X6

25X6

B THAILAND IS PAYING FOR ITS PRO-WESTERN STANCE BY AN INCREASING INCIDENCE OF GUERRILLA WARFARE. THE GUERRILLA GANGS ARE SMALL, AND CANNOT ACCOMPLISH MUCH, BUT THE VIET CONG HAD THE SAME LIMITED ASSETS IN SOUTH VIETNAM IN 1959.

1. FORTUNATELY, WE KNOW A LOT MORE ABOUT COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS NOW THAN WE DID 10 YEARS AGO, AND THE THAI GOVERNMENT AND ARMED FORCES HAVE BEEN GLAD TO ACCEPT OUR TRAINING PROGRAMS. THEY ARE NOW ENGAGED IN BOTH SUPPRESSION OPERATIONS, AND

CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS DESIGNED TO DENY THE GUERRILLAS THE DISCONTENT, THE ISOLATION, AND THE POVERTY ON WHICH INSURGENCIES FEED AND GROW STRONG.

2. WE HAVE PROVIDED OCCASIONAL HELICOPTER LIFT. OTHERWISE, THE THAIS THINK THAT THEY HAVE STARTED THEIR PREVENTIVE MEASURES SOON ENOUGH TO DO THE JOB THEMSELVES, AND WE THINK SO TOO.
3. THE GUERRILLAS GET THEIR INSTRUCTIONS FROM NORTH VIETNAM, AND THEIR TRAINING AND PROPAGANDA SUPPORT FROM BOTH PEKING AND HANOI. THEY BEGAN THEIR OPERATIONS IN NORTHEAST THAILAND, WHERE THERE ARE SOME 40,000 VIETNAMESE REFUGEES, BUT THERE HAVE BEEN OUTBREAKS IN THE CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN PARTS OF THE COUNTRY AS WELL.
4. THE ENCOURAGING ASPECT IS THAT THEY HAVE NOT BEEN WELL RECEIVED BY THE PEOPLE, PARTLY BECAUSE ^{GUERRILLAS} THEY HAVE TO LIVE OFF THE COUNTRY, AND ARE STILL FEW ENOUGH IN NUMBERS SO THAT THEY HAVE TO USE FORCE RATHER THAN PERSUASION TO OBTAIN SUPPLIES.

Switch
to 6

(MAP, VIETNAM)

VIETNAM

6

I. AS FOR VIETNAM,

2. I AM NOT GOING TO GIVE YOU A BLOW-BY-BLOW ON THE MILITARY PROGRESS THERE; THAT COULD TAKE ALL DAY, WITHOUT ADDING TOO MUCH TO WHAT YOU CAN READ IN THE PAPERS.

A. INSTEAD, I THINK THE MILITARY SITUATION CAN BE SUMMARIZED THIS WAY: SINCE AMERICAN COMBAT TROOPS WENT IN IN THE MIDDLE OF 1965, WE HAVE TAKEN THE INITIATIVE AWAY FROM THE COMMUNISTS AS FAR AS MAIN COMBAT FORCES ARE CONCERNED; WE HAVE PREVENTED THEM FROM MASSING TO LAUNCH AN OFFENSIVE; AND WE HAVE INFLICTED HEAVY CASUALTIES.

B. LAST YEAR THE COMMUNISTS LOST 56,000 KILLED IN ACTION, BY ACTUAL BODY COUNT, AND ANOTHER 20,000 TURNED THEMSELVES IN.

C. YET OUR ORDER OF BATTLE SHOWS THAT THE ENEMY HAS MORE MEN THAN EVER UNDER ARMS--THE MAIN COMBAT FORCE CONSISTS OF 21 NORTH VIETNAMESE AND 12 VIET CONG REGIMENTS--MORE THAN 130,000 MEN IN ALL. THE PARA-MILITARY GUERRILLA FORCES BRING THE TOTAL UP TO AT LEAST 300,000.

~~THE INDICATIONS ARE THAT THE COMMUNIST COMMAND HAS DECIDED IT IS TOO COSTLY AT PRESENT TO FIGHT MAJOR MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS AGAINST SUPERIOR FIRE POWER AND AIR SUPPORT. SO THEY ARE GOING TO RE-EMPHASIZE CLASSIC GUERRILLA WARFARE.~~

~~THIS IS NOT PURE GOOD NEWS. IT IS BASICALLY~~

Handwritten notes:
 C. ~~can mass~~
 as in North
 major attack
 DNE elements
 at 4 DNE
 (circled) ~~to avoid~~
 making point
 and

II. The indications are that the Communist command has decided it is too costly at present to fight major military engagements against our superior fire power and air support.

- (put together major formations,)
- A. They can still ~~****~~ as they have ~~****~~ around the border between North and South Vietnam. There, our Marines are running into elements of four divisions. We will run into concentrations like this when the enemy feels that the target, or the weather, or our own dispositions justify the risk.
- B. In general, however, the Communists are going to try to avoid major unit contact, and re-emphasize classic guerrilla warfare.
1. This ~~****~~ shows that our spoiling operations have produced good results, but it is not purely good news. It is easier to kill one wildcat than 10 weasels. Suppressing small hit-and-run bands of guerrillas

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~~ONE WILDCAT THAN TEN WEASELS, SUPPRESSING~~
~~GUERRILLA WARFARE~~ TAKES A GREAT DEAL MORE
EFFORT, AND VERY MUCH MORE TIME, THAN DEFEATING
A CONVENTIONAL MILITARY FORMATION IN PITCHED
BATTLE.

C. THERE ARE NO EASY SOLUTIONS. SOME SUGGEST THAT
ALL WE HAVE TO DO IS BOMB HAIPHONG AND THE HO CHI MINH
TRAIL. I HAVE MENTIONED BEFORE THAT THE WAR SUPPLIES
THAT REACH NORTH VIETNAM DO NOT COME IN THROUGH
HAIPHONG. AS FOR THE MAIN SUPPLY LINE, WE HAVE
ESTIMATED THAT LAST YEAR, 155 COMMUNIST BATTALIONS,
EACH FIGHTING ON THE AVERAGE OF ONE DAY OUT OF EVERY 35,
COULD GET BY ON AS LITTLE AS 20 TO 30 TONS OF SUPPLIES
A DAY BROUGHT IN FROM OUTSIDE--AND IF WE COULD CUT
EVERY ROAD IN LAOS, THEY COULD STILL BRING THAT MUCH
DOWN THE JUNGLE TRAILS ON THE BACKS OF AN ARMY OF
COOLIES.

1. NOW THERE ARE EVEN MORE BATTALIONS, AND WE ARE
FORCING THEM TO FIGHT MUCH MORE OFTEN, BUT THE
DISCOURAGING FACT IS THAT DURING THE FOUR-DAY TRUCE
FOR THE LUNAR NEW YEAR, WHEN WE SUSPENDED OUR
AIR AND SEA INTERDICTION, THE COMMUNISTS WORKED
LIKE BEAVERS BY DAYLIGHT AND MOVED NOT 20, BUT
15 TO 20 THOUSAND TONS OF SUPPLIES SOUTH, TO AND
ACROSS THE BORDERS OF SOUTH VIETNAM.

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(6)

III.

YOU CAN USE THE SAME SUMMARY FOR POLITICAL STABILITY, AND FOR PACIFICATION. THE NEWS IS ENCOURAGING, BUT WE STILL HAVE A LONG, LONG WAY TO GO.

A. SAIGON HAS COME UP WITH A GOOD DRAFT CONSTITUTION, AND THE OUTLOOK IS THAT BY THE END OF THIS YEAR, THE MILITARY REGIME WILL HAVE TURNED OVER AUTHORITY BY DUE PROCESS TO AN ELECTED, CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT.

1. IN THE FACE OF VIET CONG INTIMIDATION AND THREATS, ~~MORE THAN~~ ^{ABOUT} 80 PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS ^{SEPTEMBER} CAST THEIR BALLOTS LAST ~~WINTER~~ TO ELECT THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, ~~AND THIS MONTH~~, VOTING ^{IN APRIL}

^{AND MAY} FOR VILLAGE AND DISTRICT COUNCILS IS SHOWING ~~THE~~ SAME 80 PERCENT PARTICIPATION.

2. MORE THAN 20 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION LIVES IN AREAS UNDER FIRM VIET CONG CONTROL, AND HERE, OF COURSE, THERE WERE NO ELECTIONS.

3. BUT WE CALCULATE THAT ~~IN AREAS NOT UNDER VC CONTROL~~ MORE THAN 70 PERCENT OF THE ELIGIBLE VOTERS ARE REGISTERED, ~~IN AREAS NOT UNDER VIET CONG CONTROL~~ ^{OF THOSE WHO ARE} AND WHEN 80 PERCENT ~~VOTE~~ ^{REGISTERED VOTE}, THAT MEANS THAT 56 OUT OF EVERY 100 ELIGIBLE CITIZENS ARE CASTING THEIR BALLOTS, WHICH IS AN EXCELLENT PERFORMANCE BY AMERICAN STANDARDS.

B. AS FOR PACIFICATION, ~~A LITTLE MORE THAN~~ ^{ABOUT} 60 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL POPULATION IS COUNTED IN AREAS CONSIDERED UNDER FIRM GOVERNMENT CONTROL. A MAJOR EFFORT IS GOING TO BE MADE TO EXPAND AND FIRM UP PACIFICATION, AND THE ENEMY KNOWS IT.

✓

QUARTER OF 1967

1. IN THE FIRST ~~QUARTER~~ **QUARTER** THERE WERE MORE THAN 200 ATTACKS ON THE SPECIALLY TRAINED PACIFICATION TEAMS TRYING TO RESTORE ORDER AND DEVELOP LOYALTY IN THE COUNTRYSIDE--AND MORE THAN 100 OF THESE ATTACKS CAME IN MARCH ALONE, SO THE PACE IS BEING STEPPED UP.
2. A GOOD SHARE OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY IS NOW GOING TO BE ASSIGNED TO PROVIDING SECURITY FOR THE PACIFICATION EFFORT, WHILE THE AMERICANS, SOUTH KOREANS, AUSTRALIANS AND NEW ZEALANDERS CONTINUE TO HUNT DOWN THE ENEMY MAIN FORCE.

IV

THERE IS NOT, AND THERE NEVER HAS BEEN, ANY GREAT SENSE OF NATIONAL ~~IDENTITY~~ **IDENTITY** IN VIETNAM; THE VILLAGER KNOWS LITTLE ABOUT THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN SAIGON. TO HIM, AUTHORITY IS THE HAMLET HEADMAN, OR THE VILLAGE CHIEF, OR POSSIBLY THE DISTRICT CHIEF. THIS IS ONE THING THE SPECIAL **PACIFICATION** ~~TEAMS~~ **TEAMS** ARE TRYING TO REMEDY.

- A. BUT THIS DOES NOT MEAN WHAT YOU OFTEN READ, THAT THE VILLAGERS OPPOSE THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT AND REALLY SUPPORT AND SYMPATHIZE WITH THE VIET CONG. AND WE HAVE THE EVIDENCE TO SHOW THIS.
- B. IF THIS WERE A "PEOPLE'S WAR OF LIBERATION," AS THE COMMUNISTS CALL IT, ITS LEADERS WOULD BE LOCAL PATRIOTS.
- C. INSTEAD, WE KNOW FROM PHOTOGRAPHS, AND FROM THE TESTIMONY OF DEFECTORS AND PRISONERS, THAT THE CENTRAL OFFICE FOR SOUTH VIETNAM, WHICH DIRECTS BOTH THE COMMUNIST MILITARY EFFORT AND THE POLITICAL WORK

6

OF THE SO-CALLED NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT, IS
COMMANDED BY-A NORTH VIETNAMESE GENERAL, NGUYEN
CHI THANH, WHO IS THE SECOND-RANKING MAN IN THE
NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES, GENERAL GIAP'S
DEPUTY, AND A MEMBER OF THE NORTH VIET POLITBURO.

1. I DO NOT RECALL THAT EITHER THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE OR BARON VON STEUBEN RAN THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS OR COMMANDED THE ARMY DURING OUR REVOLUTION.
 2. IN COSVN, THE DEPUTIES TO NGUYEN CHI THANH FOR BOTH MILITARY AND POLITICAL AFFAIRS ARE NORTH VIETNAMESE GENERALS WHO ARE MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE NORTH VIET COMMUNIST PARTY.
 3. WE HAVE IDENTIFIED AT LEAST FIVE OTHER SENIOR NORTH VIETNAMESE GENERALS RUNNING MAJOR MILITARY COMMANDS IN SOUTH VIETNAM SINCE 1964.
- D. IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT THERE ARE FOUR MILITARY REGIONS, RUNNING FROM NORTH TO SOUTH, IN NORTH VIETNAM, AND THE VIET CONG CONTINUED THE SAME NUMBERING SYSTEM, STARTING WITH MILITARY REGION FIVE AND RUNNING ON DOWN ACROSS SOUTH VIETNAM.
1. BUT THE TWO NORTHERNMOST PROVINCES OF SVN ARE IN MILITARY REGION FOUR, ADMINISTERED AS PART OF THE DRV FROM HANOI.
 2. MR FIVE, WHICH RUNS DOWN TO DARLAC AND KHANH HOA PROVINCES, IS COMMANDED BY A NORTH VIETNAMESE, LT.GENERAL HOANG VAN THAI, WHO IS THE NORTH VIETNAMESE VICE MINISTER OF DEFENSE.

(OFF)

E. AS FOR THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT, WHICH IS SUPPOSED

TO BE A COALITION OF ALL REBEL PATRIOTIC ELEMENTS, REPRESENTATIVE OF ALL OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE, IT HAS FIVE VICE CHAIRMEN--AND AT LEAST THREE OF THE FIVE ARE KNOWN COMMUNISTS.

E. IV. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, THE COMMUNISTS KNOW THAT THEY CAN NO LONGER WIN BY TERRORISM OR BY FORCE OF ARMS IN SOUTH VIETNAM; THEY CAN ONLY WIN BY WAITING US OUT, BY HOPING THAT THE FREE WORLD FORCES WHICH DEFEND SOUTH VIETNAM--AND THAT MEANS MAINLY THE UNITED STATES--WILL TIRE OF THE WAR AND PULL OUT, OR BE FORCED OUT BY WORLD PUBLIC OPINION.

THIS HOPE EXPLAINS WHY THEY SHOW NO READINESS TO NEGOTIATE. IT SUSTAINS THEM--AND AT THE SAME TIME, IT IS THEIR ULTIMATE VULNERABILITY, BECAUSE IF WE CAN MAKE IT CLEAR TO THEM THAT THERE IS NO SUCH HOPE, THAT THE BEGINNING OF DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH VIETNAM ARE GOING TO BE DEFENDED, NOT DESERTED--THEN HANOI TOO WILL FINALLY BE FORCED TO REALIZE THAT THIS PARTICULAR BALL GAME IS OVER.

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AT THIS POINT, I PROPOSE TO SKIP GEOGRAPHICAL ORDER, AND JUMP TO CUBA, BECAUSE TODAY THERE ARE ACTUALLY THREE BRANDS OF COMMUNISM--RUSSIAN, CHINESE, AND CUBAN--WHICH POSE A THREAT TO US, AND FIDEL CASTRO'S EFFORTS TO SPREAD HIS REVOLUTION IN THIS HEMISPHERE CAN BE PARTICULARLY VIRULENT AND VIOLENT.

CUBA

(MAP, CUBA)

- I. Fidel Castro, in Cuba, has been endowed by the Soviets with the strongest military establishment in Latin America.
- A. Morale is good, especially among the officers. The armed forces are loyal to Fidel Castro. They are fully capable of maintaining internal order, and they could defend Cuba against anything short of a large-scale invasion backed by U.S. help.
- B. They have about 150 Soviet surface-to-air missile launchers, covering the areas shown by the circles on the map. They have tactical surface-to-surface missiles, patrol boats armed with missiles, and MIG-21 jet fighters, ~~wikk~~ some of them with all-weather capabilities.
1. Over the past ~~7~~^{eight} months, there has been a considerable increase in Soviet military shipments.
2. Except for the new MIG's and another six missile patrol boats, however, these shipments have consisted of replacements and spare parts.
3. They started a new wave of rumors about offensive missiles, because there have been a lot of missiles for the surface-to-air launchers.

These missiles have now been in Cuba for their

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normal shelf life, and they have to be replaced.

- C. I want to assure you that we use every useful
intelligence asset to keep a close ^{watch} ~~eye~~ on Cuba.
Once every month we assess all the reports, and all
the rumors, match it up against the best intelligence
we have, to reach a judgment on whether there are
offensive weapons on the island which could be used
to attack the United States.

1. The rumors keep coming in, but the assessment
remains negative.

II. Castro's threat to the United States is not a direct
one. His threat is to stability in Latin America.

(MAP, LATIN AMERICA)

- A. A couple of years ago the Soviets worked out
an agreement with Castro that all Communist
efforts in Latin America would be channeled
through the orthodox Communist parties in the
various countries.

1. The orthodox Communists today are still
willing to support a so-called War of
National Liberation, or stage a revolution,
when they judge there is a chance for success.
2. But they ~~believe~~ also believe that when
the odds are against insurrection and insurgency,
they should use opportunities for subversion
and political action---what they call the
"peaceful road to power."

- B. In many countries of Latin America, there are

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(8.)

dissidents who have left the regular Communist Party, forming their own, pro-Chinese and more militant wing, faction, or separate party.

1. There are also left-wing extremists who are Communists--either not ~~xxxxxx~~ Moscow-style or Peking-style,--and who are more militant than the orthodox party. An example is the Movement of the Revolutionary Left, or MIR, in Venezuela.

2. These militants favor instant revolution. The MIR launched a guerrilla war in Peru two years ago, with Cuban support, training, funds, and weapons,--and some from the Chinese as well. They have been virtually wiped out.

C. Moscow, especially since the Cuban missile crisis, considers such insurrections too wasteful, and too alarming to the West, when there isn't a reasonable chance for success. That's why Moscow tried to hobble Castro's efforts.


III. Now Castro has junked the agreement. He has continued all along to train and arm guerrillas for other Latin American countries, and support them with propaganda. For the past year or so, despite the agreement, he has supported them in armed action---in Venezuela, in Colombia, in Guatemala, where he considers the time is ripe for action. ~~7. [redacted]~~

~~B The Cubans are also trying to develop or expand guerrilla forces in [redacted]~~

A. This winter, a new guerrilla ~~campaign~~ campaign has been launched in ~~the~~ the remote, mountainous area of southeastern Bolivia. The guerrillas are well-trained, well-led, and well-equipped, and in every case, as prisoners have testified, this is due to Cuban support.

B. The Cubans are also trying to develop or expand guerrilla assets in Ecuador, in Brazil, in Peru

again, and in Panama.



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~~again, and in Panama.~~

Castro

C. In most of these countries, ~~he~~ is either working with dissident Communist parties and non-Communist extremists of the left--like the guerrillas of Douglas Bravo in Venezuela--or, ~~with~~ as in Guatemala, with individuals in the local Communist leadership who agree with him rather than Moscow, and want a more militant policy.

IV. What is his motive? Well, it must be a strong one; in ~~his latest~~ *a recent* speech, he went so far as to say that the Soviets, by dealing with the governments in Latin American countries where there are guerrillas in the field, are betraying the revolution and helping to suppress it. Castro isn't even talking to the Chinese Communists these days, but there are times when he sounds like them.

A. ~~For one thing,~~ *91* To Castro, revolution appears to be a way of life. He apparently has a token contingent of Cubans in North Vietnam, and will probably send more if the North Vietnamese ask him to.

2 He has trained revolutionaries from Africa, and has sent several hundred Cubans to the former French Congo to train the militia for the leftist government there. *913* He had instructors with the revolutionaries in the former Belgian Congo for a while.

B. Specifically, however, Castro wants *more* ~~another~~ Communist take-overs in the Western Hemisphere. He apparently

fears that unless, as he has so often predicted, his Cuban revolution becomes an example for other Latin American Communists, his own dynamism and mystique in Cuba could atrophy and eventually lose its effect.

1. He has an economic mess on his hands at home, and even if he gets a record sugar crop this year, world sugar prices aren't going to make Cuba prosperous. He needs successes abroad to rally the people at home.

C. Castro sees his best chance at present in Venezuela, Colombia, and Guatemala. But there are plenty of other opportunities which will arise elsewhere in Latin America, as long as the Communists can turn economic misery and public dissatisfaction into vulnerabilities for the established governments.

D. This is what makes such a vital program out of counter-insurgency.

(MAP, INSURGENCY IN COLOMBIA)

E. THIS MAP SHOWS AREAS OF INSURGENCY IN COLOMBIA TODAY. THERE ARE ONLY HALF A DOZEN OF THEM, MAINLY IN RELATIVELY REMOTE MOUNTAIN AREAS.

(MAP, INSURGENCY IN SOUTH VIETNAM, 1959)

F. BUT IN 1959, WHEN THE FIGHTING WAS RESUMED IN SOUTH VIETNAM, THERE WERE ALSO ONLY HALF A DOZEN BLOTCHES OF INSURGENCY--AND TODAY, MORE THAN A MILLION ARMED MEN ARE TRYING TO SUPPRESS THAT INSURGENCY. IT PAYS

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BETTER TO ELIMINATE THE VULNERABILITIES WHICH
CREATE THE CLIMATE IN WHICH INSURGENCY CAN
START AND SPREAD. THAT IS ONE OF THE AIMS
OF THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS.

Switch
to (11)

I. FINALLY, WE MIGHT TAKE A VERY QUICK SWING AROUND THE
WORLD FOR SOME THUMBNAIL SUMMARIES OF THE SPOTS
WHERE WE HAVE TROUBLE OR POTENTIAL TROUBLE.
(MAP, SOUTH ASIA)

II. INDIA: INDIA HAS ITS FILL OF TROUBLES--POLITICAL,
ECONOMIC, AND MILITARY; DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN.

A. THE RECENT ELECTIONS CUT THE RULING CONGRESS PARTY
OF NEHRU DOWN TO ITS THINNEST PARLIAMENTARY EDGE
SINCE INDEPENDENCE, AND ~~LEFT~~ THE GOVERNMENT ~~IN~~ *IN*
MAJORITY CONTROL OF THE STATE GOVERNMENTS IN ~~most~~ *only*

8 OF THE 17 STATES.

B. THE RESULTING INSTABILITY IS GOING TO COMPLICATE
THE PROBLEMS OF DEALING WITH THE FOOD CRISIS--AND
INDIA IS GOING TO NEED MASSIVE FOOD IMPORTS AT LEAST
FOR THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS.

C. EXTERNALLY, THE INDIANS REMAIN APPREHENSIVE OVER
THE BELLIGERENT CHINESE POSTURE ON THE HIMALAYAN FRONTIER,
AND THERE IS NO PROGRESS TOWARD A SETTLEMENT OF THE
KASHMIR DISPUTE WITH PAKISTAN. THERE IS NOT LIKELY TO BE.

1. AS A NUMBER OF UNITED NATIONS COMMISSIONS HAVE FOUND,
PAKISTAN HAS THE STRONGER CASE, BUT INDIA HAS EFFECTIVE
POSSESSION. *92.* THE INDIANS FEAR THAT ANY RELAXATION OF
THEIR HOLD ON KASHMIR WOULD INFLAME ^{OTHER} SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS
IN A COUNTRY WHERE THERE ARE 14 MAJOR LINGUISTIC GROUPINGS
AND DOZENS OF ETHNIC SUBDIVISIONS.

*Switch
to 12*

Insert on page 48

C. Greece is too paralyzed by its own domestic troubles at present to contribute much to NATO, or to ~~negotiate~~ negotiate its differences with Turkey. The monarchy and democratic government are equally in trouble. The April 21st coup was staged, not by the King or the senior military commanders, but by a group of second-echelon colonels who had grown impatient over the inability of the constitutional government to cope with the leftists, and feared that impending elections would produce at least a neutralist if not a left-wing government. These coup leaders have no program, and little ability to run the country, but it is doubtful that they will be willing to ~~restore~~ ^{restore} democratic government without assurances that the left wing will not be able to ~~win~~ win control of parliament.

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(MAP MIDDLE EAST)

III.

IN THE MIDDLE EAST, OUR PROBLEMS COME IN THREE GEOGRAPHIC LAYERS: STARTING AT THE TOP, THE SO-CALLED NORTHERN TIER IS SO ROCKY YOU CAN BARELY CALL IT AN ALLIANCE.

A. Greece and Turkey, who are supposed to tie the Northern Tier to NATO, have been at each other's throats and close to war over Cyprus. Off and on for the past two years they have been trying to negotiate a solution, but every time they appear to be making progress, [REDACTED]

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B. Turkey, in addition, has developed a streak of independence which has required a review of practically all of our bilateral agreements with Ankara. An attempt to improve relations with Russia went so far recently as to produce a state visit by Kosygin. It was a somewhat chilly visit, but it was the first time a Soviet premier has ever visited Turkey.

Insert
C.

D. In Pakistan, the other anchor which ties the Central Treaty Organization into SEATO, the Paks have been taking arms aid from any available supplier since we suspended shipments during the Kashmir fighting---and that includes Communist China. Now President Ayoub has fired his ~~pro-Communist~~ pro-Peking Foreign Minister, and is trying to smoothen relations with the United States, but Kashmir is a problem like Cyprus. It will cause recurrent problems for our relations with allies, whether we take sides or try to stay neutral.

E. In Iran, the Shah has been shaken by the way arms aid to Pakistan was cut off. He is convinced that

he has been wondering whether he, too, shouldn't diversify his arms sources. As a result, he has just arranged a deal for some support and transport equipment from the Soviet Union, and is trying to increase economic relations with the Soviet Bloc.

N. In the southern part of the Middle East, the fighting is stepping up again in the Yemen. Egyptian aircraft has used gas against the royalists, and have twice bombed towns on the Saudi Arabian side of the rather vague border. King Faysal of Saudi Arabia, as a result, is about to resume full-scale aid to the Yemeni royalists.

4B. If that weren't enough trouble, the British are determined to get out of Aden in 1968 by setting up a South Arabian Federation, and so far they have no confidence that they have created any government that can stand up against subversion directed by Egyptian agents.

4C ~~In the center of the Middle East, it's a continuing struggle between Nasir of Egypt, leading the radicals like Syria and to some extent Iraq, against the moderates: Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Lebanon is trying to stay neutral. The Israelis didn't help matters by attacking Jordan in their reprisal raid in November. They were retaliating for terrorist raids which came from Jordan, but were staged by guerrillas operating at Syrian instigation. The raid almost forced Jordan to accept Egyptian aircraft and Iraqi troops. Next time, the Israelis will probably~~

C. In the Middle East, the Arab world is divided in a continuing struggle between Nasir of Egypt, leading the radicals, and the moderates--~~principally~~ principally Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Lebanon is trying to stay neutral.

1. The Israelis didn't help matters ^{with their reprisal} ~~with their~~ raid into ~~attacked~~ Jordan last November. They were retaliating for terrorist raids which came from Jordan, but which the Israelis were well aware were staged by guerrillas trained, equipped, and directed by Syria.
 2. The raid almost toppled King Husayn, which would have dropped Jordan into Nasir's lap, and almost forced Jordan to accept Soviet aircraft from Egypt--along with Egyptian technicians--and Iraqi troops.
 3. The trouble is that the Syrian terrain fronting on Israel isn't conducive to quick, sharp reprisal raids. In the last incident, however, in April, Israel turned it into an air battle, and Israeli Mirages shot down six Syrian MIG-21s without loss.
 4. This knocked out about a quarter of Syria's ~~combat-ready~~ combat-ready aircraft, and all but a couple of their pilots capable of flying MIG-21s. ~~It~~ ^I had the added benefit of supporting King Husayn's decision
- Approved For Release 2000/06/07 : CIA-RDP79T00827A000800090010-0 Egypt was offering.

(MAP, AFRICA)

V Last stop, Africa. There are so many countries, and so many trouble spots, that there is no time to analyze them individually, so I'll just have to generalize. ~~A. By and large, Africa~~ ^{has a} ~~consists of~~ few countries in the South, sometimes called the White Redoubt, where the countries are still run by and for Europeans, or at least Whites of European stock. Q1 As long as this situation exists, there are going to be Africans either waving guns at the frontiers, or waving speeches in the United Nations, trying to force the major powers to step in and clear the way for majority African rule.

Q2 Sanctions, by the way, are not going to work against Rhodesia as long as South Africa and the Portuguese African colonies help Rhodesia to evade the full force of the sanctions.

B. The rest of Africa, by and large, consists of new nations where the African leadership is a paper-thin veneer. Q1 The Chinese Communists and the Russians are competing to develop influence over some of these men; the Western powers are doing their best to support and sustain the rest; and if they two sets of African leaders - a handful of men - kill each other off or neutralize each other, below them there is nothing. Q2 There are only a handful of viable economies at present on the entire continent.

C. Africa, then, is going to provide trouble spots for years to come.